8 research outputs found
Analysis of reaction and timing attacks against cryptosystems based on sparse parity-check codes
In this paper we study reaction and timing attacks against cryptosystems
based on sparse parity-check codes, which encompass low-density parity-check
(LDPC) codes and moderate-density parity-check (MDPC) codes. We show that the
feasibility of these attacks is not strictly associated to the quasi-cyclic
(QC) structure of the code but is related to the intrinsically probabilistic
decoding of any sparse parity-check code. So, these attacks not only work
against QC codes, but can be generalized to broader classes of codes. We
provide a novel algorithm that, in the case of a QC code, allows recovering a
larger amount of information than that retrievable through existing attacks and
we use this algorithm to characterize new side-channel information leakages. We
devise a theoretical model for the decoder that describes and justifies our
results. Numerical simulations are provided that confirm the effectiveness of
our approach
LEDAkem: a post-quantum key encapsulation mechanism based on QC-LDPC codes
This work presents a new code-based key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) called
LEDAkem. It is built on the Niederreiter cryptosystem and relies on
quasi-cyclic low-density parity-check codes as secret codes, providing high
decoding speeds and compact keypairs. LEDAkem uses ephemeral keys to foil known
statistical attacks, and takes advantage of a new decoding algorithm that
provides faster decoding than the classical bit-flipping decoder commonly
adopted in this kind of systems. The main attacks against LEDAkem are
investigated, taking into account quantum speedups. Some instances of LEDAkem
are designed to achieve different security levels against classical and quantum
computers. Some performance figures obtained through an efficient C99
implementation of LEDAkem are provided.Comment: 21 pages, 3 table
Assessing and countering reaction attacks against post-quantum public-key cryptosystems based on QC-LDPC codes
Code-based public-key cryptosystems based on QC-LDPC and QC-MDPC codes are
promising post-quantum candidates to replace quantum vulnerable classical
alternatives. However, a new type of attacks based on Bob's reactions have
recently been introduced and appear to significantly reduce the length of the
life of any keypair used in these systems. In this paper we estimate the
complexity of all known reaction attacks against QC-LDPC and QC-MDPC code-based
variants of the McEliece cryptosystem. We also show how the structure of the
secret key and, in particular, the secret code rate affect the complexity of
these attacks. It follows from our results that QC-LDPC code-based systems can
indeed withstand reaction attacks, on condition that some specific decoding
algorithms are used and the secret code has a sufficiently high rate.Comment: 21 pages, 2 figures, to be presented at CANS 201
Secure Key Encapsulation Mechanism with Compact Ciphertext and Public Key from Generalized Srivastava code
Code-based public key cryptosystems have been found to be an interesting option in the area of Post-Quantum Cryptography. In this work, we present a key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) using a parity check matrix of the Generalized Srivastava code as the public key matrix. Generalized Srivastava codes are privileged with the decoding technique of Alternant codes as they belong to the family of Alternant codes. We exploit the dyadic structure of the parity check matrix to reduce the storage of the public key. Our encapsulation leads to a shorter ciphertext as compared to DAGS proposed by Banegas et al. in Journal of Mathematical Cryptology which also uses Generalized Srivastava code. Our KEM provides IND-CCA security in the random oracle model. Also, our scheme can be shown to achieve post-quantum security in the quantum random oracle model
LEDAcrypt: QC-LDPC Code-Based Cryptosystems with Bounded Decryption Failure Rate
We consider the QC-LDPC code-based cryptosystems named LEDAcrypt, which are under consideration by NIST for the second round of the post-quantum cryptography standardization initiative. LEDAcrypt is the result of the merger of the key encapsulation mechanism LEDAkem and the public-key cryptosystem LEDApkc, which were submitted to the first round of the same competition.
We provide a detailed quantification of the quantum and classical computational efforts needed to foil the cryptographic guarantees of these systems.
To this end, we take into account the best known attacks that can be mounted against them employing both classical and quantum computers, and compare their computational complexities with the ones required to break AES, coherently with the NIST requirements.
Assuming the original LEDAkem and LEDApkc parameters as a reference, we introduce an algorithmic optimization procedure to design new sets of parameters for LEDAcrypt.
These novel sets match the security levels in the NIST call and make the C reference implementation of the systems exhibit significantly improved figures of merit, in terms of both running times and key sizes.
As a further contribution, we develop a theoretical characterization of the decryption failure rate (DFR) of LEDAcrypt cryptosystems, which allows new instances of the systems with guaranteed low DFR to be designed.
Such a characterization is crucial to withstand recent attacks exploiting the reactions of the legitimate recipient upon decrypting multiple ciphertexts with the same private key, and consequentially it is able to ensure a lifecycle of the corresponding key pairs which can be sufficient for the wide majority of practical purposes
QC-MDPC: A Timing Attack and a CCA2 KEM
International audienceIn 2013, Misoczki, Tillich, Sendrier and Barreto proposed a variant of the McEliece cryptosystem based on quasi-cyclic moderate-density parity-check (QC-MDPC) codes. This proposal uses an iterative bit-flipping algorithm in its decryption procedure. Such algorithms fail with a small probability. At Asiacrypt 2016, Guo, Johansson and Stankovski (GJS) exploited these failures to perform a key recovery attack. They introduced the notion of the distance spectrum of a sparse vector and showed that the knowledge of the spectrum is enough to find the vector. By observing many failing plaintexts they recovered the distance spectrum of the QC-MDPC secret key. In this work, we explore the underlying causes of this attack, ways in which it can be improved, and how it can be mitigated. We prove that correlations between the spectrum of the key and the spectrum of the error induce a bias on the distribution of the syndrome weight. Hence, the syndrome weight is the fundamental quantity from which secret information leaks. Assuming a side-channel allows the observation of the syndrome weight, we are able to perform a key-recovery attack, which has the advantage of exploiting all known plaintexts, not only those leading to a decryption failure. Based on this study, we derive a timing attack. It performs well on most decoding algorithms, even on the recent variants where the decryption failure rate is low, a case which is more challenging to the GJS attack. To our knowledge, this is the first timing attack on a QC-MDPC scheme. Finally, we show how to construct a new KEM, called ParQ that can reduce the decryption failure rate to a level negligible in the security parameter, without altering the QC-MDPC parameters. This is done through repeated encryption. We formally prove the IND-CCA2 security of ParQ, in a model that considers decoding failures. This KEM offers smaller key sizes and is suitable for purposes where the public key is used statically
Analysis of reaction and timing attacks against cryptosystems based on sparse parity-check codes
In this paper we study reaction and timing attacks against cryptosystems based on sparse parity-check codes, which encompass low-density parity-check (LDPC) codes and moderate-density parity-check (MDPC) codes. We show that the feasibility of these attacks is not strictly associated to the quasi-cyclic (QC) structure of the code but is related to the intrinsically probabilistic decoding of any sparse parity-check code. So, these attacks not only work against QC codes, but can be generalized to broader classes of codes. We provide a novel algorithm that, in the case of a QC code, allows recovering a larger amount of information than that retrievable through existing attacks and we use this algorithm to characterize new side-channel information leakages. We devise a theoretical model for the decoder that describes and justifies our results. Numerical simulations are provided that confirm the
effectiveness of our approach
LEDAkem: a post-quantum key encapsulation mechanism based on QC-LDPC codes
This work presents a new code-based key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) called LEDAkem. It is built on the Niederreiter cryptosystem and relies on quasi-cyclic low-density parity-check codes as secret codes, providing high decoding speeds and compact keypairs. LEDAkem uses ephemeral keys to foil known statistical attacks, and takes advantage of a new decoding algorithm that provides faster decoding than the classical bit-flipping decoder commonly adopted in this kind of systems. The main attacks against LEDAkem are investigated, taking into account quantum speedups. Some instances of LEDAkem are designed to achieve different security levels against classical and quantum computers. Some performance figures obtained through an efficient C99 implementation of LEDAkem are provided